The Culture of Charity:
An Interview with Arthur C. Brooks
Editor’s Note

In this issue of Religion & Liberty we meet a giant of the Twentieth century: Alexander Solzhenitsyn of Russia. He has been both widely celebrated and widely reviled. His courage is admirable—risking his life and suffering the torment of the Soviet gulag. Now in his old age, his place is secure as a hero in the history of liberty.

For those unfamiliar with the great Russian, Acton’s own John Couretas provides an excellent introduction to Solzhenitsyn in his review essay. As Couretas notes, because Solzhenitsyn was at the same time a serious Christian, devoted patriot, and defender of liberty, he was not well received by those who thought Christianity and patriotism were enemies of freedom. For those of us who believe in both religion and liberty, Solzhenitsyn is a friend.

I would like to use this space to note the death late last year of Milton Friedman. Professor Friedman’s rather well-known discomfort with religion renders him a rather unsuitable candidate for a profile in pages dedicated to the intersection of religion and liberty, but he remains an important figure. Indeed, that is why he was the chosen interview subject sixteen years ago in only the second issue of Religion & Liberty (Michael Novak was the first). You can read the 1991 interview at www.acton.org and see how reluctant he was to entertain a positive role for religion.

Yet it is important that Friedman be remembered as an advocate for the personal liberty we argue for at Acton, and not merely economic efficiency. To be sure, he believed that economic liberty produced greater economic wealth and better opportunities for the poor. Yet he was passionately committed to economic freedom as an essential part of human liberty itself. Indeed, as is not often remarked, Friedman went so far as to argue that he would favor free markets and economic liberty even if those arrangements were less economically efficient. His argument was that such liberties corresponded to human nature and therefore were appropriate for societies in which men and women were to flourish. The argument for liberty is one principally concerned with the nature of the human person and his good. And because it begins with who the human person is, it is the happy result that human liberty also makes for good politics and efficient economics.

One other note: I hope our feature interview with Arthur C. Brooks will encourage many readers to look at his important book, Who Really Cares—a study of charitable giving. Longtime readers of Religion & Liberty will not be surprised by his findings, but they are remarkable nonetheless and deserve wide attention.

Peter Raymond

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Arthur C. Brooks, the author of Who Really Cares (Basic Books, 2006), is a professor at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Public Affairs and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Reviewing the book in The Wall Street Journal, Wilfred McClay wrote: “Mr. Brooks concludes that four distinct forces appear to have primary responsibility for making people behave charitably: religion, skepticism about the government’s role in economic life, strong families and personal entrepreneurship.” Brooks took time recently to speak with Religion & Liberty managing editor David Michael Phelps.

What motivated you to write this book? What questions were you hoping to answer?

I’m an economist and I’ve been doing charitable giving research for a long time. When economists look at charitable giving now, they always ask these prosaic questions like, “what will happen to charitable giving if we decrease the death tax by a quarter?” They’re important questions, but they’re really all about economic incentives. Over the years I’ve been involved in a lot of charitable giving efforts from the university and through my own church. Nobody has ever said to me privately, “The reason I give is because of that sweet tax break.” That’s not why people give.

One of my great mentors is James Q. Wilson, a classic case of someone who has social science tools and chooses to answer the most interesting questions. Most social scientists actually choose not to answer interesting questions because that gets you in trouble. And that’s a ridiculous reason to not do research on important topics that actually affect people’s lives. But when you’re a full professor with tenure, like I am, you’ve got no excuse. A couple of years ago I said, “I’m protected in my career. It’s time to say something about why people give.” I have all the data. I own all the data on this stuff. So I figured nobody’s really looked effectively at the culture and politics of giving, and it was time to do it. And so I embarked on the study and systematically went through what I thought were the biggest social and cultural reasons why people give, and reported my results.

In your book, you identify four predictors of charity: religion, skepticism about the government in economic life, work, and strong families. How effective are these four categories in predicting the personal giving of individuals?

They’re hugely effective. Nothing is deterministic, which means that these things don’t absolutely determine charitable giving, but predict charitable giving in an uncannily accurate way. The first is faith. Faith is one of the major predictors of values in American life and indeed in most countries. In the United States, in particular, faith and the lack of faith have defined a lot of cultural differences that intrude on our lives everyday—everything from politics to how we feel about public expression, to what commentators call the coarsening of our culture. It’s not to say that people who are secular have a coarse culture and people who are secular can’t give. We’re just saying that faith predicts so accurately many of these social phenomena that you can’t ignore it. It’s causal, actually.

And so that’s where I start the story. I found this difference between conservatives and liberals, and it wasn’t because of politics. So I said, what is it due to? Why is it the conservatives give more than moderates and liberals? And the reason starts with the fact that there are so many religious conservatives in this country. And religious people just give like crazy. Religious liberals give like crazy. They give as much as religious conservatives, but there are fewer than one-third as many. So just by virtue of the arithmetic, you find that religious conservatives make conservatives look really good. That’s the first.

The second is the belief that the role of government is to provide for needs—that belief in and of itself suppresses charitable giving. Ask somebody, “do you think the government should do more to redistribute income?” People who strongly disagree with that give twelve times more money a year to charity than the people who strongly agree with that. You virtually never see differences that are that big.

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In the “Ascent,” one of the autobiographical sections of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago*, you will find the justly famous assertion that “the line separating good and evil passes not through states, nor between political parties—but right through every human heart.”

And read just a little further and you come to these words, not so well known but just as true, which describe the evil that roots itself not in the personal, but in the political:

… I have come to understand the falsehood of all the revolutions in history: They destroy only those carriers of evil contemporary with them (and also fail, out of haste, to discriminate the carriers of good as well). And they then take to themselves as their heritage the actual evil itself, magnified still more.

Solzhenitsyn was a writer whose vast body of work, beginning with the great artistic achievement of the stories and novels, but also of course the essays and speeches, was guided by a great moral imagination. The writer who took the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath as his great theme and life’s work, could only understand what happened to Russia in terms of good and evil. Those who engineered and imposed the Bolshevik and Soviet nightmare were not merely ideologues, they were evildoers.

In *The Solzhenitsyn Reader: New and Essential Writings 1947-2005* (2006, ISI Books), editors E. Ericson, Jr., and Daniel J. Mahoney have assembled, in one volume, a new collection of the author’s work that provides a broad sweep of his prodigious talent: history, autobiography, political writing, speeches, fiction, and poetry. Ericson and Mahoney place Solzhenitsyn—who always first and foremost considered himself a writer and artist—in the tradition of Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, “a moralist who defends age-old distinctions between good and evil and truth and falsehood.”

With this excellent new reader, the editors also hope to provide a corrective to the many misstatements and misinterpretations of Solzhenitsyn’s work and life. These misreadings—which lately seem more based on disinterest or neglect—come from both the left, which could not forgive Solzhenitsyn for so devastatingly exposing the violence and the lies of Soviet totalitarianism, and the right, which suspected that the writer was no friend of liberty.

In their illuminating introduction, Ericson and Mahoney state simply that, “Solzhenitsyn was the most eloquent scourge of ideology in the twentieth century.” The editors are right to remind us of that. And any news account, biography or political history of the twentieth Century that talks about who “won” the Cold War—a complicated historical reality for sure—and
Solzhenitsyn and Russia’s Golgotha

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn Gulag Mugshot 1953

It was his experience with the realities of the Soviet system that brought him to his metanoia, the change of mind that put him on the road to repentance.”

Solzhenitsyn’s deeply religious view of things is everywhere evident in Ericson and Mahoney’s new volume. It is there explicitly in the poem “Acatistus” with its intensely personal, hymn-like theme of repentance in the face of “purpose-from-on-High’s steady fire.” There is the short story “Easter Procession,” in which a gang of young hoodlums threatens a solemn procession of believers on the holiest day of the Orthodox Christian calendar. Or the slow, wrenching torment of Zinaida, the young woman in The Red Wheel, whose selfish rendezvous with a lover has led, she believes, to the neglectful death of her infant son. Transfixed before an icon of Christ, deaf to a church service going on around her, Zinaida perceives that “Christ was suffering acutely, suffering yet not complaining. His compassion was for all those who approached him—and so at that moment for her.”

Solzhenitsyn follows God, and it is not so hard to imagine why the writer has been ignored or dismissed by Western secular progressives and much of the media. While some may be able to tolerate his decorative Russian Orthodox pieties, it is the stark morality behind it, and the perfectly orthodox understanding of the Christian faith, that cannot be ignored. Says Ericson and Mahoney: “Solzhenitsyn accepts the validity of a classical Christian cosmology and anthropology, one that has nothing in common with facile modern (and postmodern) belief that that universe is indifferent or even hostile to human purposes.”

This new volume includes Solzhenitsyn’s famous 1978 commencement address at Harvard (deserving to be read at least annually), where he catalogued the West’s failings, including rampant materialism, the superficiality of the media, and the moral cowardice of intellectuals. (A prophet tends to speak his mind, even when invited to the most exclusive parties.) At Harvard, before the cream of the Cambridge intelligentsia, Solzhenitsyn accused the West of leaving behind “the moral heritage of Christian centuries with their great reserves of mercy and sacrifice.” He took the political and intellectual elites to task for cowardice, a “lack of manhood” in its dealings with international aggressors and terrorists. He lamented the “boundless space” that the West had provided for human freedom but without making any distinctions for human decadence. “The West has finally achieved the rights of man, and even to excess, but man’s responsibility to God and society has grown dimmer and dimmer,” Solzhenitsyn told the Harvard crowd.

As a boy, Solzhenitsyn was deeply influenced by his Aunt Irina who instilled in him a love of literature and of Russian Orthodoxy. But he drifted away from the Christian faith under the spell of state indoctrination in Marxist-Leninism. It was his experience with the realities of the Soviet system that brought him to his metanoia, the change of mind that put him on the road to repentance. “He returned
with adult thoughtfulness to the Christian worldview of his rearing,” the editors write. “Solzhenitsyn’s mature articulation of Christian truths was deeply informed by his experience in the prison camps. There he witnessed human nature in extremis

demned man: “Interrogation and trial are merely judicial corroboration. They cannot alter your fate, which was previously decided. If it is necessary to shoot you, then you will be shot even if you are altogether innocent. If it is necessary to acquit

and learned about the heights and depths of the human soul.”

Solzhenitsyn reserved his harshest condemnation for his own, particularly the Soviet leadership, and could not forgive what he saw as passivity in so many Russians during the long terror. The political problem was, again for the author, not so much a matter of sorting out competing political systems, but a question of evil.

In a chapter of the *Gulag Archipelago* that looks at the history of the Soviet political police, one of the interrogators tells a con-

you, then no matter how guilty you are you will be cleared and acquitted.”

The chapter closes with the narrator discussing the just punishment for evildoers. He talks about the vigorous prosecution of Nazi war criminals in West Germany—by one count some 86,000 convicted by 1966. And he compares that with the almost total lack of any justice served for the architects of Soviet terror: “Someday our descendents will describe our several generations as generations of driving do-nothings. First we submissively allowed them to massacre us by the millions, and then with devoted concern we tended the murderers in their prosperous old age.”

But for those descendents to come to conclusions about “driving do-nothings” they will first need moral criteria. And that is what worries Solzhenitsyn. In a 1993 address in New York, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the author observed that “for a post-modernist, the world does not possess values that have reality.” Perhaps it is the moral reality provided by true faith that most threatens revolutionaries and totalitarians, and explains why the Church, which stands in the way of these utopian fantasies, receives so much of their fury.

Russian historian George Vernadsky estimated that between the years 1917-1920 “several hundred bishops, priests, and monks were either shot or starved to death in prisons.” In 1922, the Soviets confiscated religious art and liturgical items, citing the need to raise funds to
Why is the Acton Institute producing documentaries?

In a word, audience. With this year’s release of The Call of the Entrepreneur, Acton is embarking on one of the most important—and potentially most influential—media programs in its seventeen-year history.

Acton has always been a leader on the communications front. This is true for our high quality journals and newsletters, and for our web presence, which makes use of the latest tools such as podcasts, video, and the Acton PowerBlog. The move into documentaries is a natural progression and one that taps into the dominant medium of our age—the motion picture—in high definition video.

The Call of the Entrepreneur tells the story of three very different entrepreneurs—a farmer, a financial executive and a retail and media baron who escaped from communist China. In their own way, each put their God-given creativity to work building wealth, creating useful new services and goods, and providing opportunities for countless others to improve their lot in life. The documentary is an inspirational story—many who’ve seen it have been greatly moved by it—and it’s one that is contrary to the culture’s often dominant image of the business person as a greedy fat cat.

Frankly, most documentaries produced today on political and economic themes are not very friendly to the “free and virtuous society.” Acton doesn’t believe that it’s smart to leave this powerful medium to those who would produce more sensational works like Fahrenheit 9/11 or An Inconvenient Truth. We have high hopes for The Call of the Entrepreneur, and have plans for more compelling documentaries in the works. We hope you’ll be educated—and entertained—by what’s to come.

Witnesses said “enemies of the people” were brought to the shooting range in food vans marked "MEAT." Shootings went on non-stop day and night in the later stages.

Solzhenitsyn, now eighty-eight and for a long time back in his native land, understands this. If he had only written history, his contribution to our understanding of political terror and totalitarianism would be incalculably great. But he also gave us the artist’s moral vision. And that is something that Russia—and the West—need now more than ever.
If one becomes aware that the original moral argument for socialism is wrong—that capitalism is actually benefiting people and serving the common good—why would one hold on to the ideology rather than abandon it? Clearly, it is difficult to abandon a lifelong ideology, especially if one considers the only available alternative to be tainted with evil. Thus socialism was for generations of socialists simply an entrenched dogma. It was possible for them to argue the finer points, but not to abandon it. However understandable this might be, it is not praiseworthy. To hold on to a doctrine that is demonstrably false is to abandon all pretense of objectivity. If someone could demonstrate to me that free markets and private property rights lead to impoverishment, dictatorship, and the violation of human rights on a mass scale, I would think that I would have the sense and ability to concede the point and move on. In any case, socialists lacked any such intellectual humility. They clung to their faith—their false religion—as if their lives were at stake. Many continue to do so today.

Most intellectuals in the world are aware of what socialism did to Russia. And yet many still cling to the socialist ideal. The truth about Mao’s reign of terror is no longer a secret. And yet it remains intellectually fashionable to regret the advance of capitalism in China, even as the increasing freedom of the Chinese people to engage in commerce has enhanced their lives. Many Europeans are fully aware of how damaging democratic socialism has been in Germany, France, and Spain. And yet they continue to oppose the liberalization of these economies. Here in the United States, we’ve seen the failure of mass programs of redistribution and the fiscal crises to which they give rise. And yet many continue to defend and promote them. The older socialists dreamed of a world in which all classes the world over would share in the fruits of production. Today, we see something like this as new Wal-Marts—to cite only the most conspicuous example—spring up daily in town after town worldwide. Within each of these stores is a veritable cornucopia of goods designed to improve human well-being, at prices that make them affordable for all. Here is a company that has created many millions of jobs and brought prosperity to places where it was sorely needed.

Although the free enterprise system obviously does not incorporate the old socialists’ idea of a commonality of goods, it does seem to achieve the common good as they conceived it. What then can we say of those who today remain attached to socialism as a political goal? We can say that they do not know or have not understood the economic history of the last 300 years. Or perhaps we can say that they are more attached to socialism as an ideology than they are to the professed goals of its founders.

When we speak of the common good, we need also to be clear-minded about the political and juridical institutions that are most likely to bring it about. Let me list them: private property in the means of production, stable money to serve as a means of exchange, the free-
“Take care not to perform righteous deeds in order that people may see them otherwise, you will have no recompense from your heavenly Father. When you give alms, do not blow a trumpet before you, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets to win the praise of others. Amen, I say to you, they have received their reward. But when you give alms, do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing, so that your almsgiving may be in secret. And you Father who sees in secret will repay you.”

In this passage and those surrounding it, Jesus compares the rewards of “the hypocrites” and those who follow his words. But some of the subtlety of the lesson is lost in translation. When describing the reward of the hypocrites, the Greek word used for reward denotes giving of a receipt for a full payment—in other words, a commercial transaction.

This is important because it creates an important distinction, a distinction between giving because of what it gives the recipient and giving because of what it gives the giver. Should praise become the motivation of a gift, the gift ceases to be a gift because it has become instead the purchase of praise.

This is why our Lord warns us against announcing our good deeds. He wants us to love, to give of ourselves, to give ourselves truly as gifts. But even in this, there is temptation. If we allow ourselves praise for our good works, we risk falling into the trap of purchasing praise.

The idea is this: in giving, let us be so other-directed that we become self-forgetful. Let us be so focused the outstretched hands of the needy that our own hands are unaware of what the other is doing.
In his biography of St. Thomas Aquinas, G. K. Chesterton said that “most men must have a revealed religion, because they have not time to argue.” The same might be true for political philosophy. In the Age of Information, most men do not have time to sift critically through the barrage of information that comes their way. So if most people do not have time to reason out their own political philosophy, how do they decide which to adopt as their own?

Sixty years ago, in a time of less noise, Friedrich Hayek offered an answer. His essay, The Intellectuals and Socialism, examined “the character of the process by which the views of the intellectuals influence the politics of tomorrow.” Ideas move, said Hayek, from the scholars to the masses via the Intellectual, the “secondhand dealer of ideas.” The “power [Intellectuals] wield in shaping public opinion” is therefore very great, and Hayek proved this by showing how socialism moved in precisely this fashion, from Scholar to Intellectual to mass implementation.

What was therefore necessary, said Hayek, was that classical liberalism pony up with its own intellectual project, and the last sixty years has seen Hayek get his wish in the Conservative Movement. But this present essay has less to do with the intellectual project of classical liberalism and more to do with what has been, by and large, a failure to create “a new liberal program which appeals to the imagination”. While conservatism is now a powerful force in the American political landscape, it is still the underdog in a war of connotation. (This is evident in the fact that the phrase ‘compassionate conservative’ had to be invented.) And I think there are two reasons why conservativism, by and large, does not yet appeal to the heart as does “bleeding heart” liberalism.

Firstly, as Hayek says in his essay, the socialist program promises a utopia, very much an emotional idea. Since conservatives tend not to believe in utopian social structures, they are less likely to promise the grandiose, and more likely to prescribe practical, more foundational, less emotional policies.

However, this is not to say that the conservative movement does not have ideals which appeal to the imagination (and therefore to the hearts) of the masses – freedom and virtue are the stuff of our greatest stories. No, what is lacking is not the ideas, nor the imaginative capacity of those ideas. What is lacking in modern conservatism, in large part, is the mechanism to communicate the ideas in ways that capture both the Truth and Beauty of those ideas. What is missing, by and large, is the Art of Story.

To understand this, it is important to make a distinction between two types of logic. This distinction (given eloquent expression in the work of the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar) is between narrative logic and syllogistic logic, or Story and Syllogism, and is explained concisely by David Yeago:

> “[T]he coherence of a narrative is of a different kind than the coherence of a syllogism. The latter sort of coherence is deductive; the conclusion is given in the premises and needs only to be drawn out of them. The coherence of a narrative, by contrast, has room for freedom and thus for surprise. It is a coherence which is not already given at the start, but only in and with the story’s resolution, when the climactic events actually occur and draw together the threads of the plot into a unity. The coherence of a drama is established from the end of the story, not at its beginning, although that end is aimed at by the playwright from the beginning.

This is an important distinction because it offers a reason why those who argue with narrative logic, or Story, have easier access to the hearts and minds of the masses than those who rely solely on Syllogistic Logic. Scholars who form ideas largely use syllogistic logic, deduction. And while Syllogism is a critical tool in coming to the truth of things, it isn’t necessarily the best tool in conveying the truth of things. Stories, on the other hand, contain a totality of an idea along with a unifying beauty, an emotional power that smuggles an idea into the head by way of the heart. Or to put it another way, an idea can be the corollary of an accepted artistic unity. This is why novelists and filmmakers can be such powerful convincers – they rely on the totality of
The Leaky Bucket: Why Conservatives Need to Learn the Art

their presentation to make their ‘argument.’ Both Story and Syllogism are important, but in the age of visual media, Story is increasingly important to convince those “who have no time to argue.”

Both Story and Syllogism

If anyone doubts that those who tell the better stories have the upper hand in the arena of ideas, let him consider the recent popularity of the ONE Campaign. Is it a flash of economic enlightenment that drives the masses to Bono like sinners to the Jordan? No. While his economic patron, Jeffrey Sachs, is by no measure a lightweight, Bono owes the success of his appeals to end poverty less to his economics and more to his formidable ability as an artist to highlight the human in humanitarianism, to appeal to the narrative and emotional sensibilities of young people, to take an idea from a scholar’s head to a citizen’s heart.

Imagine, then, if sound economic (or political or social) thinking were wedded not only with the intention to act, but with Beauty, the inspiration to act. This is what the Story artist can do, if he can be given the right ideas and the trust to manifest them in Art, not propaganda. Storytellers and Artists, whether they have right ideas or not, will create. But as Chesterton said, “poetry without philosophy has only inspiration, or, in vulgar language, only wind.” So it is best that the Beauty he creates also contain Truth.

So what must happen is that those with solid ideas, derived from Syllogistic Logic, must not only educate the Artists, but also allow them to translate Syllogisms into Stories, into unified presentations of the Truth in Beauty. It is this that will achieve long lasting change in the hearts of the finicky MTV generation. Unfortunately, this can be frightening for those committed to protect right ideas, because the “coherence of a narrative … has room for freedom and thus for surprise.” Communicating with Story means one has to allow for a dramatic tension, has to allow the audience the possibility of seeing the viability of the other side of the argument. And for some, this is too risky a venture.

But here we reach a very crucial point, the point where we see that handing ideas to the Artist is not the same as handing them to the Propagandist. For the Propagandist, the message is the focus, the party line is towed without falter, and as a result, the Propagandist seldom produces Art of lasting persuasive power. For the Artist, the vehicle of the message – that is, the Art itself – is the focus, and this is precisely why Artists are so much more convincing in their work than Propagandists: Propagandists so concentrate on the water that they attend less to the holes in the bucket.

Artists concentrate on making great buckets, often concerning themselves less with the contents.

Likewise, conservatives may be more apt to produce propaganda when they attempt to create Art because their ideas are often more sound than the liberal (in the modern sense) alternative and they have less need for – and therefore less incentive to learn – Story. Liberals can indulge themselves in shoddy Syllogism, because they make up for the lack with good Storytelling. But this doesn’t excuse conservatives from falling off the other side of the horse.

There a popular saying that suggests “If you are a liberal when you are young, you have no heart. If you aren’t a conservative when you are old, you have no head.” But I see no reason why must we lack one to have the other. We should have, and must communicate with, both. We must add Story to our Syllogism, adding emotional punch to our reason. After all, Socrates taught with syllogisms, and Jesus with parables.

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“ There a popular saying that suggests “If you are a liberal when you are young, you have no heart. If you aren’t a conservative when you are old, you have no head.”
Even when you correct for income and age and education, there are big differences that persist between [those two] groups.

This boils down to a world philosophy. Whose responsibility is it to solve problems? All of us are somewhere between the idea that the government should do it all and that we should do it all. What you find is that for people who believe that it’s the responsibility of society writ large [to solve problems], that very belief is suppressing their charitable giving. I think that most people who have those views and get that result and behavior don’t realize it. I think people are just not aware that, in fact, your views on government are not a viable substitute for personal checks.

Most of my friends and colleagues are liberals, and this is one of the things that most characterizes the difference between political conservatives and liberals: the views on income redistribution. Liberals yell at me a lot saying, “we don’t believe in income redistribution!” But if you ask, “Do you think the government should do more to redress income in equality,” 80 percent of liberals say yes and 27 percent of conservatives say yes. This is the issue that differentiates conservatives from liberals today. [It] just culturally makes it harder for people who believe in income redistribution to give intuitively, to take personal ownership of a problem. And the one thing is, they’re not bad people. I just think that this is impulse. I think it’s human to feel compassionate because you’re willing to do something.

When we talk about a religious impulse behind charity, do we mean all religious traditions are equally engaged in helping the poor and needy? Well, it’s not all just helping the poor and needy. Giving to others is really what I’m talking about. A pretty small percentage of charitable giving actually makes its way to the poor. We do give away vast amounts that we share with each other. We give away a lot; it’s just that not all of it is redistributed. The problem is that there are some people that think that charity is not redistributive, it’s not charity. I can’t imagine disagreeing more with that point of view, because I think that we need to share, and we all have needs, and our society has needs that are not just handing out sandwiches. We have needs for symphony orchestras and universities and environmental organizations, and that stuff is not redistributed, but we really need it and we need charity to pay for it. So, it doesn’t socially trouble me that not all charity is going to the poor and needy, but what we should find is that religious people are more likely to give to all causes, and in both formal and informal ways, including to totally secular causes.

Most people, I would guess, would argue that first of all a certain level of prosperity is necessary for the kind of charitable giving that takes place in the United States. Can charitable giving contribute toward a more prosperous society? Actually, the first thing that we find is that charitable giving is not predicated on having a lot of means. The working poor and the working lower middle class are actually the most generous Americans, when you look at the percentage of their income that they give away. And these people, ironically, have no tax incentive to give either. So, we Americans can take a charity lesson from people with modest means who work for a living in the United States. That’s one thing that actually is pretty shocking, at least to me, that these are America’s big givers. And a lot of that, once again, has to do with faith. But it’s also true that the working poor and the working lower middle class are a highly income mobile group. And then, it’s not a coincidence. My own research on family income shows that families that give tend to see about a four to one income increase that comes because of their charitable gifts in the long run. And the idea is that families that give have a different quality to them than families that don’t give. They have more family integrity, and they’re more likely to have healthy habits. They have more of a sense of meaning. They’re more productive. They’re liked better. They’re more socially adjusted and integrated. And the end result is that charitable giving is one of the things that measures the likelihood of people being successful.

You also find that charitable giving is part of the economic growth process: that when the United States gives more, it sees enormous return on investment in GDP over time. But probably the biggest impact that you see in people’s lives is the happiness, the very clear happiness advantages that they get when they give. There are a lot of before and after experiments where people are measured on their happiness with surveys, and then they’re asked to participate in a charitable giving experience of some kind, and then they measure their happiness again. In virtually every case, they get happier, even if they’re helping the homeless or dying people. And the physiological explanation is that endorphins are released in the brain when people serve others. You actually get a helper’s high, and that’s precisely what psychologists call it. Psychologists have taken to
prescribing service to others as a manner of therapy for patients. I’ve talked to clinical psychologists who routinely prescribe volunteering in a soup kitchen. It’s rather extraordinary because the benefits are so distinct.

*Is the idea of incentive antithetical to charity?*

Frequently what we think of as rewarding people’s charity is really just taking barriers away. It’s just dismantling disincentives to giving. In other words, I’m not going to confiscate as much of your money if you give. That’s what tax breaks are. It’s not like you give something to charity and the government gives you a gift. They just take less of your money. That’s not really a reward. That’s simply taking away some of the barrier to giving. And I think that philosophically that’s more than just a substantive difference. It’s rather an important substantive difference. Frankly, people don’t even need tax incentives. At the maximum, getting rid of the tax incentives entirely would wipe out less than 20 percent of charitable giving in the short run, and that would probably all come back in the long run. So, it does change things a little bit in the margin. I can understand moral qualms about rewarding people, paying people for their charity because that doesn’t seem like charity anymore, exactly, but getting rid of barriers is quite important.

**What effect do you think your research will have?**

Well, there are two effects that I hope it has. The first is that I hope that people read it and give more. I hope that people read it, examine their conscience, examine their giving patterns, think about the barriers to their own giving, and destroy the barriers. That’s what I want, because it’s so clear in my research that one of the greatest things you can do in your life is to give and to give more. The second measure of success for me will be if other researchers start challenging my findings and doing more research. I want replication. I want, in five years, to have more books and more articles and more op-eds out there saying, “Brooks was wrong,” or “Brooks was right,” and “I’ve got the data,” and “I’ve done this new research.” That’s really what I want because if we spur a debate, people give more—I can’t imagine defining success in any other way.

I have an opportunity to talk a lot to clergy and a lot to serious evangelicals. When I’m talking to these groups, I say, “Look into your hearts about what the Scripture really says.” When we’re talking about tithing, this is allegory. This is resources of value. In the American economy, the resource of value that we have is primarily intelligence, ideas, and creativity. That’s the source of wealth in America today. That being the case, how are you going to tithe that? How are you going to tithe what you truly value and what is truly the engine of your growth? If you’re just doing cash, that’s not enough. As a matter of fact, that’s not really what’s going to lift other people up. That’s not really our mission, in a sense. So I’m able to actually talk openly to challenge people to think about what tithing deeply means when we have a multi-dimensional bundle of currencies and value. How am I going to tithe my time, my love, my affection, my expertise? Thinking that way has totally changed my own views and changed my own behavior. I started writing this charity book and my wife says, “I think we need to go and adopt a kid. I mean, read your chapters. This is a blessing to you and a blessing to others. This is an expression of our values, so come on. Let’s express our values.” What am I supposed to say? No? Now we have another kid. And of course, who do you think is the net recipient of the benefit parts? Me, my wife, and our biological children. We’re the ones who made out. Just like the data said.
Without freedom, there can be no solution of the social question. . . . Under a proper marketing system, it becomes impossible for individual freedom to degenerate into the arbitrary domination of many by a few. As a result of the general interdependence between all markets, the social question can only be resolved by means of an adequate and free economic system. —Walter Eucken

An intellectual architect of West Germany’s post-war economic miracle, Walter Eucken was the primary founder of the Freiburg ordo-liberal school of economics. The son of Rudolf Eucken—winner of the 1908 Nobel Prize in Literature—Walter Eucken studied history before turning his attention to economics during his studies at the universities of Bonn, Kiel, and Jena. Eucken became a professor of economics at the University of Freiburg in 1927, remaining there until his death in 1950.

Though proficient in technical economics, Eucken was primarily interested in the broader issue of the legal rules that make both freedom and market economies possible.

The state’s economic role, Eucken argued, needed to be limited to protecting and upholding the key rules from which we derive the type of legal order that facilitates the free market’s dynamism. Eucken held that the state’s authority should be used—and used vigorously—to uphold the rule of law, private property rights, freedom of contract, and open markets. But once the state moved beyond these parameters, Eucken warned, both freedom and economic prosperity were endangered.

Following the National Socialists’ seizure of power in 1933, Eucken maintained contact with other anti-Nazi Germans who understood the need to think about how to transition a post-Nazi Germany towards a society marked by ordered liberty rather than socialism or communism.

Thus, at the end of World War II, Eucken was one of a small number of individuals able to present the intellectual case for the market economy in occupied Germany. While West Germany’s 1948 currency reform and abolition of price-controls was engineered by Ludwig Erhard, Erhard himself acknowledged Eucken as an intellectual godfather of the changes that took West Germany from rubble to riches in less than ten years.

Walter Eucken never made any secret of his Christian convictions. At the first Mont Pèlerin Society meeting convened by Friedrich von Hayek in 1947, participants were struck by Eucken’s forceful insistence Christianity’s essential compatibility with the market order. Eucken’s use of the word ordo partly reflected his effort to re-establish links between Christian social doctrine and free market thought.

Given the right conditions, Eucken believed, markets gave economic expression to man’s innate dignity in ways that collectivist alternatives never could. Eucken’s early death at the age of fifty-nine was a grievous loss to the cause of freedom and Christian faith in a Europe that deeply needed both.
It’s not entirely easy to understand why, but the term capitalism is almost universally used derisively, particularly in religious circles. To say something is capitalist is to condemn it without argument, as if the label alone settles the question.

Let’s say that we believe that there are only two possible systems of organizing the economic forces of society: capitalism and socialism. It would seem from experience and logic that there is no contest. The experience with socialism has been one long and grueling disaster for every country that has tried it, while capitalism has created prosperity consistent with human rights.

And yet I suspect that this is not what people mean when they refer to capitalism with derision. What they mean is a system of social organization that is driven by an engine dominated by large capital currying favor with an insatiable consuming public. Such a system is seen—and rightly so if that’s all there is to it—as crude, unenlightened, and contrary to all high ideals.

I can concede that what I just described is a bad system. In fact, I’ll go further and agree that such a social system is undesirable and contrary to high ideals. My problem here is the identity of such a system with the term capitalism, which might be used more broadly to refer to the economic component of the voluntary society.

Capitalism is really a misnomer. Under a voluntary economic system, capitalists have no power of compulsion. The primary influence over what is produced, how, and in what quantity are consumers. It is they who reward or discourage the production decisions of capitalists. If you know anyone in business, you know that consumers must always be the first concern. The second concern is the workers who make production possible. A capitalist who serves himself the first fruits just isn’t going to last very long in the market. Capitalist actions that are successful in the long run are always other-directed.

Perhaps the real problem is the term itself. We can gain great conceptual clarity by just letting it go and setting on some other term, such as the market economy or the business economy. But even these phrases are seriously limited because they do not account for the fullness of economic activity in society. They only cover what has been called (from the nineteenth-century) “catallactics” or the science of monetary exchange.

But monetary exchange covers only a part of overall economic activity. Providing for and managing a household is economic and yet the internal matters of a household do not usually involve monetary exchange. The massive charitable sector in the United States is funded by people giving contributions and receiving no direct good or service in exchange. This is how American houses of worship are funded, for example. For that matter, large business firms are places where the primary means of cooperation is not monetary exchange. We cooperate based on need and desire.

Should non-catallactic action be included in our definition of what constitutes economic behavior? Most certainly! A major part of the work of the Acton Institute consists in the effort to expand our understanding of what economic is. It is not only stock markets, corporate buyouts, and large chain stores. It is also houses of worship, families, extended communities, civic associations, soup kitchens, homeless shelters, and volunteer efforts of all kinds.

I have no problem in saying that these are part of the capitalist order, rightly understood. But the more important point is that they are part of the social order that respects private property, human rights, and the freedom of association. We must not think too narrowly on these questions. Economics, rightly understood, encompasses the whole range of human behavior. This is why it is such a mistake to speak with such disdain for what is merely a reflection of mutually beneficial exchanges and voluntary behaviors.

If we want to give up the term capitalism to appease its critics, so be it. But let us replace it with something even more poignant and descriptive of the reality of which we speak: freedom.

Why do their stories matter? Because how we view entrepreneurs—as greedy or altruistic, as virtuous or vicious—shapes the destinies of men and nations.